Tuesday, November 27, 2007

What gets paired in a verbal pairing procedure?

Several times in the chapters on rule-governed behavior (23, 24, 25, maybe elsewhere too), Malott discusses the verbal analog to the pairing procedure (“verbal pairing procedure” for short). Remember that a neutral stimulus becomes a learned reinforcer or a learned aversive stimulus (punisher) by being paired with a stimulus that’s already a reinforcer or aversive stimulus (Ch. 11). Like this...


According to Malott’s theory of how rule-governed behavior works, in order for a rule to control behavior, there has to be an aversive stimulus/condition that’s escaped by performing the target behavior that the rule specifies. This direct acting escape contingency is the engine at the heart of rule control. If behavior is controlled by its immediate consequences, as Malott posits, then in order to understand any behavior, including complex rule-governed behavior, we have to dig deep until we uncover whatever direct acting contingency is actually doing the work of controlling the behavior.

So in rule-governed behavior, where does the necessary aversive stimulus/condition come from? Malott makes it clear that when a rule is stated (by someone else or by oneself), and if there’s a deadline, then the combination of noncompliance with the rule (not performing the target behavior) and the approaching deadline constitutes an aversive stimulus/condition. It’s a conditional aversive stimulus because each of the two components (noncompliance and approaching deadline) by itself would not be aversive. The aversiveness of one of the components is conditional upon its being combined with the other.

But what still requires a little further clarification, I think, is why that conditional stimulus is aversive. The mere combining of noncompliance and an approaching deadline isn’t necessarily aversive. For instance, consider this rule: Take your kid to the dentist before the end of the week and you’ll receive 5 cents. Most of us would not worry about losing the opportunity for that 5 cents. So noncompliance (I haven’t taken the kid to the dentist yet) plus the approaching deadline (It’s already Friday afternoon) would not constitute an aversive stimulus/condition. But if the amount were $100 instead of 5 cents, we’d probably worry and noncompliance plus approaching deadline would be aversive. So whether or not this kind of conditional stimulus is aversive depends on the consequence specified in the contingency that the rule describes. If the consequence is sizable enough and/or probable enough, then the conditional stimulus (noncompliance + approaching deadline) will be aversive.

So back to the original question about the verbal pairing procedure. Remember that in order to turn a neutral stimulus into an aversive stimulus, it has to be paired with an already-aversive stimulus. As explained above, noncompliance with a rule plus an approaching deadline constitutes a conditional stimulus which, by itself, is neutral, that is, it’s not aversive. It only becomes aversive when it’s paired with an already-aversive stimulus, such as loss of the opportunity to receive a sizable and/or probable reinforcer. Like this…


Pardon me for getting mentalistic for just a moment, but this “pairing” doesn’t take place in the outside, observable world, but “in your head.” The proper way to say that is that the neutral conditional stimulus and the already-aversive stimulus are “verbally paired.” Or to say it another way, because we’re not talking about actually physically pairing two stimuli, this is a verbal analog of the pairing procedure.

Anyway, this verbal pairing procedure makes “it's Friday afternoon and kid hasn't been taken to dentist” an aversive condition. So now it can function as the before condition in the direct acting escape contingency that ultimately controls the target behavior, as in the diagram in the 2nd column on p. 405. This contingency and the 3rd contingency in the 1st column on that page are essentially the same, or at least we’ll treat them the same for now. I believe the before conditions described in these two contingencies are different from each other. But for present purposes they can be treated as interchangeable because under normal circumstances they would always occur together.

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