What gets paired in a verbal pairing procedure?

Several times in the chapters on rule-governed behavior (23, 24, 25, maybe elsewhere too), Malott discusses the verbal analog to the pairing procedure (“verbal pairing procedure” for short). Remember that a neutral stimulus becomes a learned reinforcer or a learned aversive stimulus (punisher) by being paired with a stimulus that’s already a reinforcer or aversive stimulus (Ch. 11). Like this...


According to Malott’s theory of how rule-governed behavior works, in order for a rule to control behavior, there has to be an aversive stimulus/condition that’s escaped by performing the target behavior that the rule specifies. This direct acting escape contingency is the engine at the heart of rule control. If behavior is controlled by its immediate consequences, as Malott posits, then in order to understand any behavior, including complex rule-governed behavior, we have to dig deep until we uncover whatever direct acting contingency is actually doing the work of controlling the behavior.

So in rule-governed behavior, where does the necessary aversive stimulus/condition come from? Malott makes it clear that when a rule is stated (by someone else or by oneself), and if there’s a deadline, then the combination of noncompliance with the rule (not performing the target behavior) and the approaching deadline constitutes an aversive stimulus/condition. It’s a conditional aversive stimulus because each of the two components (noncompliance and approaching deadline) by itself would not be aversive. The aversiveness of one of the components is conditional upon its being combined with the other.

But what still requires a little further clarification, I think, is why that conditional stimulus is aversive. The mere combining of noncompliance and an approaching deadline isn’t necessarily aversive. For instance, consider this rule: Take your kid to the dentist before the end of the week and you’ll receive 5 cents. Most of us would not worry about losing the opportunity for that 5 cents. So noncompliance (I haven’t taken the kid to the dentist yet) plus the approaching deadline (It’s already Friday afternoon) would not constitute an aversive stimulus/condition. But if the amount were $100 instead of 5 cents, we’d probably worry and noncompliance plus approaching deadline would be aversive. So whether or not this kind of conditional stimulus is aversive depends on the consequence specified in the contingency that the rule describes. If the consequence is sizable enough and/or probable enough, then the conditional stimulus (noncompliance + approaching deadline) will be aversive.

So back to the original question about the verbal pairing procedure. Remember that in order to turn a neutral stimulus into an aversive stimulus, it has to be paired with an already-aversive stimulus. As explained above, noncompliance with a rule plus an approaching deadline constitutes a conditional stimulus which, by itself, is neutral, that is, it’s not aversive. It only becomes aversive when it’s paired with an already-aversive stimulus, such as loss of the opportunity to receive a sizable and/or probable reinforcer. Like this…


Pardon me for getting mentalistic for just a moment, but this “pairing” doesn’t take place in the outside, observable world, but “in your head.” The proper way to say that is that the neutral conditional stimulus and the already-aversive stimulus are “verbally paired.” Or to say it another way, because we’re not talking about actually physically pairing two stimuli, this is a verbal analog of the pairing procedure.

Anyway, this verbal pairing procedure makes “it's Friday afternoon and kid hasn't been taken to dentist” an aversive condition. So now it can function as the before condition in the direct acting escape contingency that ultimately controls the target behavior, as in the diagram in the 2nd column on p. 405. This contingency and the 3rd contingency in the 1st column on that page are essentially the same, or at least we’ll treat them the same for now. I believe the before conditions described in these two contingencies are different from each other. But for present purposes they can be treated as interchangeable because under normal circumstances they would always occur together.

Tinkering with some contingencies in Ch. 26B

(1) In Ch. 26B on the web, Malott calls the contingency at the top of p. 7 an analog to penalty. But I think it's an analog to punishment by prevention of a reinforcer. What do you think?

Before: You will enter Heaven when you die.
Behavior: You dump a barrel of toxic waste.
After: You will not enter Heaven when you die.

(2) At the bottom of p. 12 there's a description of a rule-governed analog to punishment, and on the top of the next page it's diagrammed, but incorrectly, I think. It seems to me that the diagram should say:

Before: You won't enter Hell when you die.
Behavior: You commit one mortal sin.
After: You will enter Hell when you die.

(3) On pgs. 13-14 Malott offers the example of an analog to avoidance of the loss of the opportunity for a reinforcer (AALOR). As we've learned, if a contingency looks like an analog to reinforcement, but it includes a deadline, then it's really an AALOR. In this example, the rule is to do a good deed before the end of the day so you'll go to Heaven if you die before you wake. Malott says the deadline is the end of the day and that it functions as an S^D. But I don't think so. I think the deadline is something like "before you fall asleep and never wake up." If this rule is effective in controlling someone's good deed behavior, it's because noncompliance as sleepy time approaches is highly aversive since you won't get another chance to earn entry into Heaven if you die before you wake. This deadline is not an S^D because the corresponding S^Δ would be something like "after you wake up, still alive." In that circumstance, the target behavior of doing a good deed would still earn the reinforcer of getting to Heaven, or at least getting closer. So I think this is another example of a deadline that functions as an opportunity to respond. So I'd change the diagram at the top of p. 14 to:

Before: You won't go to Heaven.
Opportunity to Respond/Deadline: Before you fall asleep and never wake up.
Behavior: You perform a good deed.
After: You will go to Heaven.

(4) The stranded motorist scenario is another example in which the deadline functions as an opportunity to respond rather than as an S^D.

Another "opportunity to respond" vs. SD

On p. 366 Malott explained how some stimulus situations that were formerly thought to function as S^Ds don't really fit that definition. The example was Mary having to eat her meal before the deadline (mealtime's end) in order to avoid losing the reinforcer that would be delivered the next day. If that deadline functions as an S^D, then the corresponding S^Δ would be after mealtime ends. The problem with that is that after mealtime ends, it's no longer possible to carry out the target behavior of eating her meal. So instead of the deadline functioning as an S^D, Malott tells us it functions as an "opportunity to respond." This is like situations in which an operandum (e.g., the lever in a Skinner box) might seem to function as an S^D but, in fact, since the target behavior cannot even occur in its absence, the presence of the operandum really functions as the opportunity to respond.

OK, on to p. 380. Carefully think about the examples diagrammed there. It seems to me that after the play ends (labeled as the S^Δ), the target behavior of making a good play cannot be performed. If I'm right about this, then in those two diagrams, there should be no S^Δ box nor its corresponding "after" box, and the box describing the deadline should be labeled "Opportunity to respond" instead of S^D.

What do you think?

Does feedback really function as an SD?

I don’t think so, and I think Dr. Malott might agree. It’s obvious from reading his book that he and his team are always thinking more and more deeply about various issues. And my guess is that deeper thought about this issue will result in the view that rather than feedback functioning as an S^D, it functions more like a prompt.

Here’s why. In order for there to be an S^D, there also has to be an S^Δ, which is a stimulus in the presence of which the target behavior is not reinforced/punished. So think about the football scenario in Ch. 23. If feedback delivered before a play functions as an S^D, in the presence of which the target behavior will be reinforced, then the corresponding S^Δ would be no feedback delivered before the play. But if no feedback were delivered before the play, yet the target behavior occurred anyway (that is, the play was executed correctly), it would still be reinforced. This means that the “no feedback” condition is not an S^Δ. And this further means that feedback is not an S^D.

Now remember the definition of prompt - a supplemental stimulus that raises the probability of a correct response. Seems to fit, right?